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Since the introduction of mobile telephony in the early fifties in Europe, US and Japan the 
demand for this service exploded. It seems that the latent demand for mobile telecommunication 
services for decade’s continued to be very strong. Since the introduction of cellular technology 
the capacity of the services increasingly became able to meet the massive demand. Next and 
future generations of mobile telecommunication technologies bring increased transmission 
speed and more versatile services. This forces network operators to organise multi sourced 
information flows supplied by service providers to increase the network effect of the system 
instead of providing the network infrastructure and leave the content to the users as in pure 
voice telephony. The drivers and inhibitors behind the emergence and recent developments of 
mobile telecommunications systems in Europe are highlighted in this paper. Liberalisation of the 
telecom markets in Europe drove new entrants to the market and curbed excessive pricing. 
However, in recent years the lack of challenging service is the main cause for the wavering 
development of newer generations of mobile telecommunication services.  
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
Mobile telecommunication technologies have developed in successive generations. 
The first generation (1G) appeared in the 1950’s. The second generation (2G) or GSM 
technology is used massively, but challenged globally by the next (third) generation 
(3G) technologies. This sequence of generations is characterised by increasing 
capacity (higher transmission speeds) and richer content of the message.  Further 
penetration of 3G depends critically on the integration of telecommunication services 
and multimedia services, which turned out to be more complicated than most experts 
predicted. Four obstacles on this expansion path can be distinguished: Firstly, after the 
weakened financial position of mobile network operators, it became more difficult to 
finance and construct the networks because the capital markets questioned the 
profitability of these investments. This resulted in regulatory measures to facilitate the 
financial viability of UMTS networks by allowing operators to share networks and 
delay implementation. Secondly, many of the futuristic product and service designs 
(for example computerised homes and mobile telephones functioning as credit cards 
or parking tickets) of the new economy turned out to be more difficult and costly to 
develop and to market. Thirdly, many operators were drawn into costly license 
auctions and mergers that slowed down and scaled down their investments in the 
latest technology and new services. Fourthly, the operators underestimated the 
difficulties to develop new business models for voice and data in 3G compared with 
mainly voice in 2G. Despite these obstacles the markets for mobile data and mobile 
Internet have demonstrated a high and sustainable growth rate during last decade in 
Europe. Most noteworthy are the immense and surprising successes of private SMS or 
short messaging services, EMS or enhanced messaging services and the rapid growth 
of MMS or multimedia messaging services. Less spectacular have been the popularity 
of sports, news and weather information on the go.  These markets leave ample space 
for a myriad of multimedia applications. So far, technology itself seems not to be an 
obstacle. The initial disappointing adoption of 2.5 and 3G mobile telecommunication 
seems to be firmly rooted in the operators’ strategic errors and the limited supply of 
attractive mobile data services in Europe.  
 
The succession of newer generations’ telecommunication techniques shifted the role 
of the network operators from being a network manager to a content organiser. Newer 
generations make higher transmission speeds and more and richer content possible. 
Upgrading existing networks is attractive from a cost perspective, however from the 
user’s point of view the richness of the services consists of two dimensions: higher 
speed and richer content. Eventually given the consumers preferences the 
price/quality ratio of the services determines his/her choice, while National 
Regulatory Authorities (NRAs) are in charge of the welfare effects. The paper shows 
how this mass market emerged, which strategies network operators have chosen to 
introduce newer generation of mobile telecommunication in a playing field 
increasingly influenced by the governments with a special role for the NRA’s in 
breaking dominant market positions of incumbent former monopolists. 
 
The next (second) part of this paper gives a historic overview of the development of 
the GSM family standards in Europe and adoption of mobile communication services 
in the EU25. The third part is on regulatory measures, which are basically an attempt 
of the government to curb the monopoly power of incumbent network providers, by 
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stimulating entrance and actions that lower the price of telecommunication services 
and especially mobile telecommunication service.  The fourth part interprets these 
developments and hypothesises on the migration paths towards newer and faster 
mobile technologies that network operators follow in their quest for maintaining or 
gaining market shares. Gradually upgrading of GSM is one path, another one is the 
big leap forward replacing GSM by UMTS, hence stepping at once from 2G into 3G. 
In the fifth part essential variables like network effects and the data rate that 
characterise a technology of a certain generation are presented and these variables are 
without doubt one of the decisive factors is the user’s uptake and sense-making of the 
new technologies. In the final part, we make some concluding remarks.  
 
2.  HISTORIC OVERVIEW 
2.1. The Prelude 
The history of mobile telephony goes back to experiments in the US in the 1920’s 
with radio telephony (Kargman, 1978, and Agar, 2003). The first mobile phones were 
usually car-bound and AT&T launched in 1947 a highway service between Boston 
and New York after the success of first mobile telephone network in St. Louis (Agar, 
2003). Eventually radiotelephony became so crowded, especially in New York, that 
the network operators used waiting lists while candidate customers waited hoping to 
be so lucky to get a mobile phone connection (Agar, 2003). The reason for the waiting 
lists was that frequency spectrum is a limited resource. The arrival of modern 
automatic mobile telecommunications systems using cell structure helped to reduce 
the scarcity problem by offering a more efficient use of the frequency space. Two 
problems are critical in a cell structure – roaming and hand-over. Roaming is needed 
to keep track of the telephones and hand-over is needed to enable subscribers to keep 
a telephone call when moving from one cell to another. Motorola filed already in 
1973 for cellular patents
3  and the US Federal Communication Commission (FCC) 
started auctions of cellular licenses on a city-by-city basis before the break up of the 
Bell system in 1984. These auctions provoked so many applications that the FCC in 
1982 decided to award the top thirty cities directly and to allocate the other cites by 
means of lotteries (Agar, 2003). After the launch of advanced mobile phone services 
or AMPS in 1978, which was an analogue system, the first American cellular phone 
system came into operation in 1979 as a trial and went into commercial operation in 
1983
4. These services were basically city services and the myriad of mobile phone 
companies made roaming extremely difficult in the US.  
 
Mobile telephony developed in a slightly different manner in Europe. Sweden was an 
early mover with an automatic system in service in 1956
5. The national 
telecommunication authorities in Scandinavia took two important decisions in 1969-
1971. The first decision was to start the standardisation work on the future analogue 
cellular NMT standard in 1969. A working group was set up and named the Nordic 
Mobile Telephone Group, the NMT-Group
6. The second decision was to directly 
                                                 
3 The patent concerned Motorola's 1973 DynaTAC - the first cellular phone - invented by Martin Cooper and his 
team, source:  http://www.fcc.gov/omd/history/radio/quality.html
4 http://www.telecomwriting.com/PCS/history9.htm  
5 These MTL (Mobile Telephone Lauhrén) services were located around Stockholm and Gothenburg and could 
serve 100 subscribers; coverage was in the range of 25-30 km around the base stations. (Meurlings and Jeans, 
1994) 
6 Swedish Telecom (1975) 
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build manual mobile telecommunication networks with nation wide coverage to 
satisfy customer demand. This decision was in Sweden accompanied with another 
decision to let the market free for mobile telephones. The Nordic Mobile Telephone 
Groups took as a point of departure the following system requirements: automatic in 
operation, compatible, roaming between all Nordic countries, sufficient capacity, high 
reliability, low-cost infrastructure, and open specification which meant no exclusive 
supplier rights (Steinbock, 2001). It took more than ten years to develop the NMT 
standard and it was first introduced in Saudi-Arabia in 1981 and a few months later in 
the Scandinavian countries. The possibility of roaming in the Finland, Sweden, 




In the early 1980s there existed many different competing mobile telephone standards. 
When the Department of Trade and Industry and the two network operators in the 
United Kingdom (British Telecom and Cellnet) were selecting the standard of the new 
mobile telephone system they compared the NMT, with a Japanese (analogue) 
standard worldwide in use since 1979 by Nippon Telephone & Telegraph (NTT)
8, the 
German system C450, a system developed by Alcatel and Philips called MATS-E and 
the US standard AMPS. The American standard was found to meet the requirements 
of the British market – competition was secured as the standard was available from 
several suppliers and it allowed sufficient capacity as it operated at a frequency band 
only 70 MHz below the 900 MHz band. The two appointed operators and the 
Department of Trade and Industry in 1983 decided, to modify the American standard 
Advanced Mobile Phone System (AMPS) and named it Total Access Communication 
System (TACS)
9.A third applicant for a license in the UK named Racal the 
predecessor of Vodafone heavily influenced this decision. The reason for choosing the 
US standard was the assumed attractive price of handsets because of the large US 
market. However Ericsson became the supplier of TACS based on its Axe digital 
switch to Vodafone, while it already supplied NMT and AMPS. This occasion made 
Ericsson a major player in the business of mobile telephony
10.  
 
2.2. The arrival of GSM 
One of the shortcomings of the analogue systems was a serious lack of 
interoperability. In order to bring interoperability and cross border roaming on a 
higher level the Groupe Spéciale Mobile (GSM), later renamed Global System for 
Mobile Telecommunications, was an initiative combining private and public 
governance (Pelkmans, 2001). GSM is an open non- proprietary and interoperable 
digital standard for cellular mobile systems operating in the 900 and 1800 MHz 
band
11. A first step towards a mutual European system was taken in 1982, when the 
Conference on European Posts and Telecommunications (CEPT) decided to create the 
                                                 
7 Sweden’s early developments are described in Gerdes, O. (1991) and in Mölleryd, B. (1999). The Norwegian 
history of mobile telecommunication can be found in Grimsteit, L. and H. Myhre (1995). Finland’s experience 
with mobile telephony can be found in Turpeinen, O. (1997). Lindmark, S. (2002) describes the history of 
mobile telecommunication in Sweden and beyond from an evolutionary point of view, based on sociological 
theories of technology development. 
8 Gruber, H. and F. Verboven (2000) 
9 Garrard, G. (1998), p 98. 
10 Meurling, J. and R. Jeans (1994) 
11 Originally GSM was planned for the 900 MHz spectrum, but the fast growing numbers of users made a new 
frequency band necessary, while the US launched the 1900 MHZ band because of the popularity of the GSM 
standard (Source: Nokia Networks, March 2003) 
  728/09/2006 
Groupe Spéciale Mobile which was commissioned to develop a mobile telephone 
standard. 
The European Commission considered it to be necessary that European network 
operators made a commitment to implement GSM-networks. The reason was that 
projections for the future growth of mobile telephony in the latter part of the 1980s 
were modest and analogue networks were expanded throughout Europe. This 
commitment convinced the industry to make substantial investments in research and 
development for the GSM standard. A Memorandum of Understanding to introduce 
GSM networks by January 1, 1991, later put forward to July 1, 1991, was signed in 
Copenhagen in 1987 by operators and regulators from thirteen European countries 
(Hultén and Mölleryd, 2003)  
 
In 1989, the European Telecommunications Standardisation Institute approved the 
specification of phase 1 of GSM. This ended the (pre-standard) effort in which 
essential patents were registered. Philips owned the most essential patents in this 
period. However Ericsson, Alcatel, Siemens and Motorola intensified their patent 
activity in the following period (from 1992 onwards). These firms controlled more 
than 85% of the total GSM market in the early 1990s and Motorola owned most of the 
essential patents. Motorola, Ericsson and Nokia rapidly came to dominate the mobile 
telephone market with Siemens and Alcatel as other important players. (Bekkers, 
Duysters and Verspagen, 2002) 
 
2.3. Market growth 
Once introduced, mobile telecommunication in the US and Europe always was in 
strong demand. In the 1990’s the rapid and sustained growth rate was accompanied by 
profound changes in the telecommunications markets. What once was the usual way  
to call someone changed from using the telephone booth or a fixed telephone line to 
using a personal phone kept in the pocket or in the handbag. 
Using a phone increasingly meant using a mobile phone instead of a fixed, a change 
that occurred in the period 1993-2002 as Table 1 shows. 
 
Table 1 Fixed and mobile telephone connections in percentage of population 
1993-2002
EU-25 1993 2002
main telephone lines  40 51
public payphones 2 2
cellular mobile telephone subscribers 2 76
Source: ITU, Yearbook of Statistics, Telecommunication Services 1993-2000. 
 
The data speak for themselves: the fact that ‘everyone has a mobile phone’ is not very 
far away in Europe. Figure 1 shows the level and pace of the diffusion of mobile 
phones in Europe. Actually there are countries that have a market penetration of more 
than 100 per cent because some individuals have multiple subscriptions, for example 
one at work and one for private use and temporary subscriptions in foreign countries. 
Convergence in market penetration among countries is obvious: A Nordic country 
like Sweden was leading the pack for quite a while, but recently Luxembourg 
overtook Sweden, while Bulgaria and Romania continue to be laggards. However 
looking into the near future it will probably not take very long to have full market 
penetration everywhere in Europe. 
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Source: See table 1 
 
2.4. Some reasons for the strong uptake in mobile phones 
 
An important driver of demand is price decreases. This was also true for the mobile 
telephone market. Additional support to the strong market growth came from the 
Internet revolution and worldwide liberalisation, privatisation and deregulation of the 
telecommunication markets. The aggregate price of mobile telecommunications has 
decreased substantially (see below) and the more convenient handsets using smaller 
more powerful batteries eventually led to different “mobile cultures”. They reinforced 
already existing trends as the Walkman and nomadic computing: cfr. rhizomatic 
identity  (Deleuze and Guattari, 1976), nomadic identity (Deleuze and Guattari, 
1980), interconnected nomadism (Braidotti, 1994) and the SMS text culture (Agar, 
2003) to mention a few. With MMS an instant mobile culture came to life: blogging 
your own pictures while on the move thereby showing others where you are and what 
you see. 
 
Although price decreases and the emergence of mobile cultures are important drivers, 
‘being in constant touch’ is today is a very common need among people around the 
world (Agar, 2003) as is the case with ‘diffuse expressive’ communication (Geser, 
2004). The mobile phone has become a symbol of status and fashion, the use of a 
mobile phone is also a part of young people’s consumption style, incidentally to a 
large part paid by their parents (Wilska, 2003). Differences among countries are quite 
remarkable as the behaviour with regard to SMS and MMS shows. Norwegians, 
Danes, Dutch and Germans send much more of SMS and MMS compared with the 
countries in southern Europe. (Smoreda and Thomas, 2001 and Mante Meijer, 2001)  
In Sweden nearly 40 million MMS were sent in 2005, an increase of 45 % compared 
with 2004 and with 600 % compared with 2003. Basically MMS follows a similar 
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growth pattern as SMS in the late 1990s.
12.  In Norway 91 million MMS were sent in 
2005 approximately 26 % more than 2004.
13. To some extent differences in SMS use 
can be explained by prices – Danes and Norwegians pay less per SMS and send many 
more SMS than Swedes that pay much more. The figures for 2005 is compelling 
reading, Swedish mobile telephone users send on average 19.7 SMS per month 
compared with 131.3 SMS per month in Denmark, 81.5 SMS in Norway and 42.7 
SMS in Finland. According to the Swedish regulator Telia charges nearly four times 




3.  REGULATION OF THE MOBILETELECOMMUNICATIONS MARKET 
IN EUROPE 
 
Global mobile communication -in all EU-25 member states- is subject to regulation 
by an independent national regulatory authority (NRA). For the broader market only 
the European Commission targets the wholesale market, hence the retail market is 
essentially a national market (EC, 2006). Consequently, there is no such thing as a 
European level playing field for mobile telecommunication. On the contrary, 
regulation is indeed fragmented, and every member state tries to make the best of it. 
To give some examples: a European license for network operators does not exist, 
there is no mutual recognition of a country’s regulation and international roaming 
charges differ widely. The possibility to create a real European market for mobile 
communication seems to be more in the hands of operators like Vodafone and Orange 
and internationally active mobile virtual network operators (MVNOs) than in the 
hands of NRAs, national governments or the European Commission. 
 
The number of mobile network operators increased considerable as a result of two 
processes. The first is the liberalisation of fixed and mobile telephony that started in 
the 1980s, the second the incorporation and partial privatisation of the former 
incumbent public telecom operators in the 1980s and 1990s. As a consequence of 
competition prices went down while traffic volumes increased. Table 2 exhibits the 
telephone traffic and the decline in prices.  
 
Table 2 Telephone calls in minutes per capita in selected countries 
1993 2002 Increase Annual % traffic growth Total % price change
Denmark 2277 4263 1986 10 -34
Luxembourg 2237 5119 2882 14 -71
Hungary 662 1193 531 9 -59
Sweden 3225 6433 3208 11 na
United Kingdom 1706 2154 449 3 1
Source: ITU database. Telephone calls comprise all traffic (telephone main lines as well as cellular); Total % 
price change refers to cellular cost for a 3minute local call (off-peak) over the period 1995-2000. 
 
Luxembourg tops the palm of telephone traffic growth and price decrease: traffic rose 
14% annually, while prices fell 71%. Other countries show also a considerable growth 
in telephone traffic during this period. The UK liberalised its telecommunication 
markets already in the 1980s and that might be part of the reason for the absence of a 
tariff decline and relatively low rate of growth of traffic in Table 2  
                                                 
12 PTS (2006) p. 78-79 
13 Post- og teletilsynet (2006) p. 2 
14 PTS (2006), p. 42 and 78. 
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Many of the former state owned public telecom operators’ mobile divisions have been 
assigned by a National Regulatory Authority (NRA) to have significant market power 
(SMP) (EC, 1997). In 2005 the number of SMP network operators diminished 
substantially: only Ireland and Slovenia have determined that some of their network 
operators have significant market power. Significant market power was defined as a 
market share of more than 25% in a relevant market. In the new regulatory 
framework, the SMP status is not solely dependent on market shares but also on other 
criteria that might reveal a dominant position. SMP assigned operators receive special 
attention from the NRAs: In principle the rules (or remedies to alleviate the negative 
impact on competition) for SMP operators are clear: their retail prices have to be non-
discriminatory, cost based and transparent and their networks accessible to third 
parties at reasonable interconnection tariffs. This, concisely, is the content of several 
directives issued by the European Commission (EC) making up the relevant 
regulation concerning mobile telecommunication in Europe
15. 
 
Despite opposition by the French and German governments (Thatcher, 2001) and 
some deviations from the SMP rule (EC, 2002) mobile telecommunication became 
liberalised by 2000 and the market for mobile telecommunication became more and 
more competitive: European regulation had in 2000 reached the whole of the 
telecommunication industry: infrastructure, fixed telephony and mobile telephony. 
 
NRAs in Europe have different competencies and status but they are all actively 
engaged in the transition process described above. Their measures have much in 
common, and they act within a complex network that involves multiple levels of 
governance. NRAs interact with consumers, business, governments, European 
institutions, and other supra national (world) institutions. NRAs deal with a variety of 
measures: licensing, numbering, broadcasting, price controls monitoring universal 
service obligation (USO), access and interconnection, dispute resolution, application 
of competition law, market monitoring, and frequency allocation. (Coen, 2005) Their 
status and resources differ with respect to independency and accountability. Highly 
independent NRAs are to be found in Denmark, Netherlands, Germany, Sweden and 
UK.  These NRAs are also subject to high upward accountability by consumers and 
business interests, however the NRAs in Belgium, Finland, Greece, France, Ireland 
and Luxembourg are considered to be less independent (Coen, 2005) 
 
Market entry began to grow after 2000 as is exhibited in Figure 2. Entry was 
substantial in the UK, the Baltic and Nordic States and Germany In these countries; 
the entering MVNOs
16 have put pressure on domestic prices. To give an example: 
interconnection prices
17 in these countries were in 2004 more than a third lower than 
                                                 
15 In the Green Paper on the Development of a Common Market for telecommunications Services and Equipment, 
COM 87) 290, the Commission announced (in 1987) the liberalisation of the market for mobile communication 
in the EU. The directive 90/388/EEC and the Proposal for a Council Directive on the Mutual Recognition of 
Licenses and Other National Authorisations to Operate Telecommunication Services, Including establishment of 
a Single Community Telecommunications license and the Setting up of a Community Telecommunication 
Committee , 92/C248/05. OJ C 248/4 followed in September 1992 
16 In July 2004 there were 80 mobile network operators and 166 MVNO’s active in EU25 (source European 
Electronic Communications Regulation and Markets 2002 (10-th Report, Annex 3) 
17 Interconnection charges for call termination in July 2004 
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in countries without MVNOs.
18. France, Spain and the Netherlands followed this 
trend in 2005. 
 
Despite the lack of a level playing field for mobile telecommunication in Europe, all 
European NRAs are participating in the so-called European Regulators Group (ERG). 
This Group takes initiatives to investigate suspicious differences in prices and 
conditions among countries. An example of joint initiatives is the above-mentioned 
suspiciously high terminating tariff that was successfully attacked by the ERG. 
However, this did not result in lower charges in all countries; Germany and France 
continue to have relatively high interconnection tariffs despite the initiative of the 
ERG to lower them. The ERG also achieved some coordination in the European wide 
fitting obligations for SMP operators and put emphasis on competition between 
mobile infrastructures. (OPTA, 2004) 
 











































































































































































































Source: Statistics in Focus, Industry trade and services-8/2005 the Annex to the 10th and 11th Report on 
European Electronic Communications Regulation and markets, 2004, 2006 
 
Providers of mobile communication that enter markets increase competition in the 
local markets for mobile telecommunication. This has an impact on the market share 
of the largest mobile network operators that very often happens to be a subsidiary of 
the incumbent fixed network operator. These effects are described in Figure 3. The 
horizontal axis represents the decrease in market share of the incumbent mobile 
network operator in the period 2004-2001; the vertical axis represents the differences 
in the price level in the period 2005-2003 of the mobile services. What we can see is 
that the price level of mobile services is negatively associated with a drop in market 
                                                 
18 This can be inferred from Annex II of the 10
TH report. The average (fixed-to-mobile) interconnection tariff in 
Denmark, Germany, Estonia, Latvia, Luxembourg, Austria, Finland, Sweden and UK was €0.117and this is 
lower than the average interconnection tariff  in Belgium, Greece, Italy, Ireland, France, Italy and Portugal 
which in June 2004 was €0.165. 
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share. In Luxembourg the incumbent operator lost 25% of its market share while the 
prices declined 8% and in Sweden the incumbent lost 5% of its market share while 
prices declined 25%. It is remarkable indeed that Finland, Luxembourg and Denmark- 
countries that already had the cheapest medium usage baskets in 2002 - exhibit the 
largest prices declines during 2003-2005. 
 
The new European 2003 regulation framework
19 defines markets from an economic 
basis (with the SSNIP criterion
20), which gives less emphasis on market shares and 
instead seeks to apply all rules (or remedies) for SMP operators. The imposition of at 
least one remedy will suffice. However, the differences between the NRAs remain. 
The power to press for a change of OFCOM of the UK is quite different from OPTA 
of the Netherlands, the former is not allowed to fine companies while the latter very 
frequently fines telecommunication companies for their anti competitive behaviour. 
 
The approach to competition policy in the telecom market in the EU has brought the 
user of telecom services lower prices, in particular in Luxembourg, Finland and 
Denmark, and to a much lesser extent in Czech Republic, Portugal, Austria and 
Greece. The question is whether the struggle between the NRAs and the SMP network 
operators leads us to sustainable competitive markets. Assessing competitiveness for 
an evolving market is a difficult exercise as Geroski (2003) points out, because the 
market and its products are subject to dynamic change. This dynamic change 
characterises the mobile communication market in particular when it comes to the 
sequence of different generation of mobile telecommunication. But it is clear that 
SMP operators know they are watched, hence they ask lower prices than non SMP 
operators. This is the case for fixed to mobile interconnection charges in the national 
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Source: EUROSTAT structural indicators for market shares and European Electronic Communications Regulation 
and markets 2004 (10th reports Annex 3) for price medium usage mobile basket 
                                                 
19 European Electronic Communications Regulation and Markets 2003, COM(2003) 715 
20 SSNIP is an acronym meaning: small but significant and non-transitory increase in price. If a company is able to 
raise its prices profitably without significant market loss during an extended period (non transitory), then the 
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Figure 3 Change in market share of leading network operators (2001-2004) 
and price levels (2004-2005) of medium usage basket of mobile services 
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4.  MIGRATION TO THE NEXT GENERATION MOBILE 
TELECOMMUNICATION: FROM 2G TO 3G 
Migrating from one to another technology can be done in several ways. The network 
operators rapidly adopted GPRS but there are more possible transitions models that 
firms can use to upgrade the mobile technology for faster data rates: 
 
o  Gradually upgrading the network, a general purpose technology type of 
argument  
o  Big leap forward, introduction of the new technology with a big bang, a 
quality of service type of argument. 
o  Alternative routes especially in urbanised areas 
 
Migration from GSM to UMTS can be done in small steps or at once. An example of 
such a small step is the upgrading of a GSM network with GPRS as is applied in the i-
mode concept of NTT DoCoMo and introduced in Europe in 2002.  An example of 
taking the big leap forward is the concept of Hutchinson 3G in the UK, Italy, Sweden 
and several other countries. 
Subsequent generations of mobile telecommunication can be characterised by 
increased data rates and enhanced functionality. The analogue first generation NMT-
mobile telephony was able to carry voice only, while the second-generation GSM 
mobile telecommunication added first SMS and WAP to its functionality. Stepping 
from one generation into the next requires an upgraded network.  
 
An example of the upgrade strategy is applying the so-called EDGE-technologies to 
an existing GSM network. EDGE or enhanced data rates for GSM evolution increases 
the data rates up to 348Kbit/s from 9.6 Kbit/s in the original GSM (Hommen, 2003). 
This is stepping from the small area 2G in the left in Figure 4 towards the middle in 
the adjacent 3G area.  This migration can be implemented without any major 
investment (Furuskar, et. al. 1999). Several other developments of wireless local and 
personal area networks also make an increase of the data rate up to 2Mbits/s possible. 
This is the 3G area in the middle of Figure 4 corresponding with smaller areas 
covered by picocells. The general idea is that wireless telecommunication can be 
accessed from several positions: using an operator’s network, using a (wireless) local 
network or (W)LAN or even a personal area network (PAN) using Bluetooth 
technologies delivering higher dates rates. According the Figure 4 it is envisaged that 
data rates up to 200 Mbps are possible in future higher generations (4G) networks, but 
this is not intended to be the fixed upper limit in the speed of data transmission in the 
future.  
 
From the operators point of view, upgrading the existing network is attractive as a 
migration model because it is cheap and needs only small complementary steps. This 
evolutionary approach is based on the idea that there should be a gradual transition 
from GSM towards UMTS, this was agreed upon within ETSI (Samukic, 1998).   
UMTS operates at much higher data rates than GSM. The GSM data rates increase 
from a maximum 9.6 Kbps to 144 Kbps in rural areas to 384 Kbps in urban areas and 
even up to 1.92 Mbps indoors using picocells. This sequence does not stop here; 
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HSPDA
21 is a mobile telephony protocol that allows (downlink) data rates up to 14.4 
Mbps. 
 
These dramatically improved data rates however carry a disadvantage that looms 
large. Upgrading means that the network operator commits as much as is possible to 
its old –lets say 2G- infrastructure carrying voice and a little data traffic induced by 
SMS. Next generation mobile telecommunication not only enhances the date rates but 
also integrates several services and if this element lacks or gets insufficient attention 
then the operators are delivering something less than what is technologically possible 
and expected by customers, because of their experiences with the possibilities of the 
Internet using PC’s, laptops and palmtops. 
 
Figure 4 Views on the successive generations mobile telecommunication 
technologies 
 
4.1. An example of migrating in small steps 
KPN attempted to duplicate NTT DoCoMo’s success in Japan. With that goal in mind 
it purchased a license of NTT DoCoMo. The Japanese operator had launched i-mode 
in Japan as early as February 1998 and the new service reached at the end of 2001 
93% of its mobile subscribers. KPN introduced i-mode in 2002 in its core markets of 
the Netherlands, Germany and Belgium. On December 18, 2002 KPN passed the 
100.000 i-mode customer mark, while at the end of the 1st quarter in 2005 this 
                                                 
21 High-speed Downlink Packet Access or HSDPA, is also called a 3.5G mobile telecommunication. This 
generation facilitates mobile broadband Internet much better than UMTS does.  HSDPA is standardised in 3GPP 
TS 25.308 version 5.4.0 Release 5 
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number is 1.876.000 (10.6% of the total number of subscribers) this amounts to a 
quarterly growth rate of almost 38%. 
 
When the Dutch network operator KPN introduced i-mode, they upgraded the existing 
GSM network to GPRS. This brings the IP protocol into the GSM network and boosts 
the data rate up to 115 Kbits/s, from 9.6 kbps. This has the advantage of being a very 
low cost strategy
22 but has the disadvantage of bringing an inferior version of the 
“new” technology to the market. Introducing i-mode meant delivering a new service 
on a handset with a fancy but small screen and an always-on connection, or in other 
words an important step towards 3G. Eventually the i-mode strategy of KPN attracted 
1.9 million i-mode users in Germany, the Netherlands and Belgium, but brought not 
the success that was anticipated
23. 
 
Increasing the quality of the low quality services – as i-mode or 2.5G can be seen 
from the perspective of the high quality 3G service - may imply a reduction of total 
subscribers. The future technology 3G might be cannibalised by the introduction of 
intermediate technologies (like i-mode or EDGE) because they steal potential 
subscribers from 3G into 2.5G. If there is a high risk that this will occur a network 
operator can opt for the big leap forward and rapidly roll-out 3G services. 
4.2. An example of the big leap forward 
When a network operator chooses the big leap forward as a migration model, then the 
new 3G technology is supplied from day one. Of course, this is a Greenfield strategy 
but it gives the advantage of being the technology leader, delivering vertical 
differentiated services of the highest possible quality. This strategy might be 
advantageous under certain conditions. First, it depends on the preference of potential 
users of the new technology and their appreciation of the high quality service. Second, 
it depends on the price of the relatively low quality 2.5G services in comparison with 
the 3G services. In general, it seems that there is a welfare gain (in terms of 
consumer’s surplus) in supplying a vertically differentiated quality of services. 
Bhargava et al. (2000) showed that the price ratio of the high quality service to the 
low is determined by the utility people attach to the high quality service including the 
network effects in relation to the utility attached to the low quality service, if the 3G 
price is lower no cannibalisation will occur. 
 
Building of 3G networks is a costly venture. The total investments in Europe amount 
to hundreds of billions of USD. The licenses in some countries cost more than the 
accumulated investments in the second generation of mobile telephone systems. In 
Germany the auction of 3G licenses gave 98.9 billion DEM, in the United Kingdom 
the auction gave £ 23 billion
24  to the authorities. 
 
The big leap strategy was followed by 3 Group (formerly called H3G) in the UK. This 
company is owned by Hutchison Whampoa (80%) and NTT DoCoMo (20%). 3 UK 
announced in November 2002 that they intended to roll-out 3G in UK, with a 
subscription fee of €105/month for voice and video calls to all mobile networks in the 
UK as well as landlines. This was the most promising tariff according to market 
research - over 15,000 consumers from 150 focus groups were surveyed between 
                                                 
22 Compared with a strategy that aims at introducing a full fledged 3G service  
23 KPN, 1
st quarter results 2005.  
24 The UMTS Forum web site: www.umts-forum.org August 5 2001.  
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November 2002 and July 2001. The fee of €105/month was more than 2.5 times 
Vodafone’s blended ARPU at that time. The prices of mobile telephones were 
announced to be in the range from € 650 - € 970 and they could be leased/rented for € 
25/month and later bought with a considerable discount. Hutchison prognosticated 
that 3 UK would have a 56% coverage of the UK at launch (December 2002) and that 




Reality turned out to be different. The first 3G telephones
26 arrived at the retail shops 
in March 2003 and some thousands of subscribers signed up for the 3G service
27 , the 
3G service was launched in the third of the same month (03-03-2003) and by June 
2003, 50 cities in the UK were covered
28 while 70% of the UK was covered in 
December 2003
29.  However the supply of handsets was insufficient and the deliveries 
didn’t start before mid April. The price of these handsets was between €600 and €680, 
but due to disappointing sales H3G halved the price to €300, on a temporary basis.  
Not only handsets but also subscriptions fees, that initially were set between €90 and 
€135/month, were lowered several times and pre-paid subscriptions were introduced 
but are today much lower than initially anticipated. 3 UK’s ARPU was €68 in 
December 2003, with 210.000 subscribers and 660.000 globally; data traffic generates 
15% of revenue
30. In 2005 the best selling price plan ‘Talk, Text & Video 600’ 
combines voice, text with a bundle of 3's video mobile services, for  €51/month, 30% 
above Vodafone’s 2005 (blended) ARPU in the UK. This price plan gives customers 
500 voice minutes, 100 minutes on any available networks in the UK, text messages, 
twenty video calling minutes from a 3 video mobile handset to another, twenty video 
messages to other 3 mobiles and a range of 3's video mobile services, including 
highlights of the Barclays Premiership, full-length music videos, comedy, games, 
news and financial information.
31. The operator 3 UK in the beginning of 2006 has 3 
million customers and 3 has almost 6 million worldwide
32, the latest services that 
have been added seek to enable customers to blog their own opinions and comments 
on their websites of their mobile telephones.  
 
The company 3 Group in Sweden is owned by Hutchison (60 %) and Investor (40 %). 
From the start in 2003 the operator used a similar strategy as 3 Group in the UK. 3 
targeted business customers and other clients interested in mobile data services. To 
attract these groups the firm sought to develop new services that used the high data 
transmission capacity in the UMTS network. The operator entered agreements with 
content providers in different sports, gambling, news, cinemas and so on. The firm 
had some success with this strategy and had the biggest subscriber base of the 3G 
operators, but was infinitesimal small compared with the 2G operators. In 2004 the 
operator changed strategy and offered a number of low cost subscriptions, for 
example 199 SEK (22 €) for 120 minutes to all networks and unlimited number of 
voice and video communication in the 3 network. These subscriptions were less 
expensive than many 2G subscription plans and the free communication inside the 3 
                                                 
25 http://www.3gnewsroom.com/3g_news/nov_02/news_2772.shtml






32 This is to say in Australia, Austria, Denmark, Hong Kong, Italy, Sweden and the UK.  
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network attracted groups and communities of customers to join 3. One spectacular 
case is the deaf community in Sweden that rapidly found that it was possible to use 
the video in the 3G mobile telephones for sign language communication. According 
to an estimate by the Swedish National Association of the Deaf has 4-6000 deaf, 
approximately half of the deaf population in Sweden a 3G mobile telephone.
33. The 
number of subscribers increased from 18.000 at the end of 2003 to 265.000 (nearly 
three per cent of the subscribers in the Swedish mobile telephone market at the end of 
2004.
34 According to the 3 Group its ARPU is much higher than the mobile telephone 
operators due to the unexpectedly high usage of non-voice services.
35 In 2005 ARPU 
in 3 Group’s Swedish and Danish operations reached SEK 382,90 (€41,25) and non 
data ARPU is 16% of the total, which is a high percentage in Sweden/Denmark but 
relatively low compared to Italy’s 40%
36. The operator 3 has continued to develop its 
offer in the Swedish market. It has created Sweden’s most successful service for 
downloading music. In 2006 3Music was elected the World’s best mobile music 
service at the GSM World Awards in Barcelona. 
 
Globally the 3 Group’s customer base reached 13.5 million in June 2006 and is 
located in nine markets: Australia, Austria, Denmark, Hong Kong, Ireland, Israel, 
Italy, Sweden and the UK.  The world market is approaching 100 million 3G 
subscribers mid 2006, Europe is the largest market, Japan comes second and the US 
third
37, while China already reached the 10 million mark in 2006.
38. ARPU of the 3 
Group is €44,66 and 28% of ARPU is related to data. However, like other 3G mobile 
network operators 3 Group’s profitability is still not achieved and earlier assumptions 
on this year’s (2006) break even proved to be false; break even is now assumed to be 
reached in the first half of 2007
39. 
4.3. What should network operators do? 
The central question is what strategy should network operators follow? Introduce the 
next generation services 3G at once or gradually improve the previous 2G networks? 
Of course, this decision depends on the position of the network operator. The majority 
of the European network operators followed an incremental strategy. They upgraded 
the 2G networks and prepared for the big leap forward by investing in UMTS later on. 
There are few operators that began from scratch i.e. do not have a previous generation 
network in operation. This does not imply that new entry will not be a successful 
strategy. In the next section, we will discuss this intriguing question in more detail, 
we close this section with some remarks. 
 
First, how to manage the risk of cannibalisation if 3G is introduced at once? The 
argument is that if 3G is competitively priced all potential demand for high quality 
mobile data services is attracted towards 3G. This potential demand consists of newly 
created demand and customers switching from 2G and 2.5 towards 3G. To decrease 
the size of the potential customer base non 3G operators apply all kind of lock-in 
costs: from SIM-locks, to high costs for terminating the current (2G or 2.5G) contract 
                                                 
33 PTS (2005a) 
34 PTS (2005b) 
35 http://www.tre.se/templates/Page.aspx?id=2009 accessed 7 July 2005 and IHT 29 June 2005. 
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before its expiry date. If these lock-in effects are substantial a new pure-play 3G 
operator gets a less significant first-mover advantage. 
 
Second, there exists a real possibility that the future state of the art technology is not 
3G. This is in particular the case in the urban areas where there are many alternative 
access technologies for mobile Internet like DECT, HiperLAN-2 and the US based 
IEEE 802.11-a and b standards 
 
5.  THE SUCCESSIVE GENERATIONS OF MOBILE COMMUNICATION 
TECHNOLOGIES 
When we focus on the economics of mobile telecommunications and when it comes 
to a next generation of mobile telecommunications then the increased data rates is just 
one of the facets of what the new technology brings. Equally or more importantly is 
the enhanced variety and quality of the services. Typical enhancements of lower 
generation services are SMS that has become MMS and news delivered in text format 
that assumes the format of streaming video and the possibility of blogging. So in 
general whatever the service will be the newer generation’s mobile 
telecommunication services becomes more complicated to organise, as more parties 
are involved compared with the previous service.   
 
As we saw above a network operator that migrates from 2G to 3G and offers more 
advanced mobile services has to decide on two variables: the price of the new services 
and the content of the new services. This decision is vital because customers derive 
utility from the quality of their mobile services in relation to the price they have to 
pay. In higher generation mobile services the quality of the services increases because 
on the one hand the content of mobile services becomes richer and on the other the 
services become faster. Richness of content can be described as the number of links 
that are provided or should we say the number of content providers involved. The 
more links a mobile service provides the more utility the services will bring for the 
customer, or in other words the quality of the services increases. The possibilities for 
mobile services can at the present stage be regarded as limitless and these serve 
several needs in contemporary life. They serve individuals who like to escape the 
current place and need location-based services, in the form of tourism information 
(Pröll and Retschitzegger, 2000) or virtual city visits. Ahonen (2002) adds the 
expansion of the concept of time that can be achieved by enjoying mobile 
infotainment, i.e. entertainment and information combined. Other possibilities are 
extending yourself and your community, expanding your financial resources and 
getting empowering devices and gadgets. Consequently the real value of a higher 
generation mobile service lay in the number of links that can be established between a 
person and the world. Therefore the number of potential users engaging in the new 
services is determined simultaneously by the difference between the price of the 2G 
services and the 3G services and the relative quality of the mobile systems.  
 
In Figure 5 the migration to the next generation is expressed in terms of utility, prices 
and penetration. Assume that the fraction of 2G users equals c and they pay a price 
p2G for these mobile services. The utility these customer derive from their mobile 
services comes from a general network effect (n) of the 2G mobile communication 
network, which is independent of prices for each technology indicated with the line 
N-n. The second part of the utility derived from the mobile service is the transmission 
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rate; this rate determines the slope of the line N-A-M. Assume the operator’s price for 
2G services is p2G and this is how the allocation A and a total fraction of 2G users 
can be understood. 
 
The introduction of the next generation in this case 3G services has in general at least 
two consequences: the price will be higher because the quality of services is higher 
but also the network effects of a 3G service are higher than for 2G services and 
reaches the level m indicated by the line N’-m in Figure 5. These effects taken 
together translates the line NAM towards N’-B” and they lead to an allocation B”, 
with a corresponding fraction of 3G users of d” (assuming no cannibalisation). 
However, if the 3G services fail to deliver the promised network effects then the line 
shift to N-B-M’ and allocation will be B with a smaller fraction (d) of 3G users. The 
difference between d” and d is the potential churn, when the 3G services fails to 
deliver the network effects, which might be quite complicated to discover. If, however  
both the transmission rate and the network effects turn out to be less than expected 
then the fraction of users will be somewhere in between 0 and d, i.e. less than 
expected. This is the basis of a higher price for later generations of mobile 
communication. 
 
Figure 5 Migration from 2G to 3G 
 
Stepping from one generation into another not only means higher data rates hence 
potentials for more utility for the user, but more utility is also added by the network 
effects because higher generations mobile service connects people more versatile and 
to a larger content base. 
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6.  Concluding Remarks 
It is remarkable indeed that countries, which already had the cheapest mobile 
communication (medium usage baskets) in 2002 - exhibit the largest prices declines 
during 2003-2005, while the most expensive countries exhibited very small declines. 
The role of the NRA’s regarding especially retail prices and interconnection prices 
seems to be quite important and the number of mobile virtual network operators 
entering has had a positive impact on competition in the mobile communication 
markets. However transparent prices and transparency in quality of services become 
more difficult to assess for users when services become more integrated in newer 
generations of mobile communications like 3G and subsequent generations, without 
the support of the NRA, National Competition Authorities and Consumer 
Organisations. 
 
In the last decade the number of subscribers exploded in the European mobile 
telecommunications networks while the ARPU fell with up to nearly 50 per cent for 
all operators. According to International Herald Tribune (2005) Vodafone earned 
24.90 € each on its 154.8 million subscribers in 2004 compared with 60.52 € per 
subscriber in 1996 when the operator had 3.04 million subscribers. Mobile data is 
regarded as one solution to this dilemma. Value-added services, MMS and video 
communication should bring higher revenue streams per customer. However, mobile 
telecommunication continues to be predominantly used for voice calls. SMS 
accounted for a little more than 11 per cent of the revenues in a country like Sweden 
and MMS contributed a fraction of this with 3 SEK per year and customer in 2004. 
 
The rise of the operator 3 in Europe can be an indication that a new business model 
for 3G has come into being. The customers are attracted with low cost monthly plans 
or low cost pre-paid card subscriptions. Once they have subscribed to the 3G services 
they start using the pay services the operator offers and as a result average spending 
goes up. 3 states this on its own web sites and comparative figures for Britain 
confirms this – average spending of a 3 subscriber is twice as high (£40) as for the 
national average (£20).  As far as stock prices say something the 3 Group (Hutchison 
telecommunication International) has been more awarded by the stock exchange than 
Vodafone Group PLC or NTT DoCoMo Inc. The 3 Groups stocks rose from 10 $ at 
the end of 2005 to 24$ in June 2006, while Vodafone stock price fell from 28$ at the 
end of 2005 to 22$ in June 2006, NTT DoCoMo stocks fell from 18 to 15$. 
 
First mover advantages for new generations of mobile telecommunications need to be 
nurtured by NRA’s by keeping lock-in costs for users to a minimum, the sooner users 
can switch to newer generations electronic communication the better the chances of 
developing state of the art technologies and value added services using the 3G 
standard. A too strong emphasis on locking in the customer base may be a short-term 
strategy that slows down technological change in the market where it is practiced and 
threatens the long-term survival of the operator in this rapidly changing market. 
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